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LIABILITY OF AN INNOCENT PRINCIPAL FOR MISREP-
RESENTATIONS OF A REAL ESTATE AGENT
Substantially the same problem has arisen in four cases within the past five
years.
In Light v. Chandler Improvement Co.x A (agent), a real estate broker with
whom the land was listed to find a purchaser, fraudulently misrepresented the
fertility of the soil. P (principal) without knowledge of the agent's misrepre-
sentations signed a contract of sale and took a mortgage as part of the purchase
price. When P sought to foreclose the mortgage, T (third person) claimed re-
coupment for fraud. Held, no recoupment.
In Lemarb v. Power2 P authorized As to find a purchaser for a plot of land
with a store building upon it. A fraudulently misrepresented to T (x) that the
store was entirely upon the plot, (2) that the Standard Oil Co. was seeking a
ten-year lease of the corner of the lot. In fact, the store extended slightly into
the public way and T was forced to pay sixty-one dollars to rectify this error.
The Standard Oil Co. had not offered to lease the property. Upon discovery of
the deception T brought this action for fraudulent misrepresentation against P
who was innocent. Held, T could recover damages for the misrepresentation
about the location of the store, but not for that concerning the fictitious lease.
In Friedman v. New York Telephone Co.4 A had written authority to find a pur-
chaser for property. He falsely represented to T that the heating and plumbing
system in the building was good. T brought an action for damages against P
who was innocent. Held, T could not recover.
In Taylor v. WilsonS A without P's knowledge falsely represented that the
premises in question had a good cesspool on them, "a mighty good one." T
sued P for fraudulent misrepresentation. Held, T could recover, one judge dis-
senting. The two opinions differ on a question of fact which neither seems to
consider important, yet which, it is submitted, is the controlling factor, both in
tory judgment bill was introduced into the House of Representatives and debated upon, June
27, 1932. H.R. 4624, 72nd Cong., ist Sess. See 75 Cong. Rec. 726 (1932). This bill was passed
on December 19, 1932. H.R. Rep. 4624, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess.; see 76 Cong. Rec. 726 (1932).
On December 20, 1932, it was referred to the Senate Committee on Judiciary. 76 Cong. Rec.
753 (1932)-
It may be of interest to compare the procedural device embodied in 18o, Judicial Code (284
U.S.C. 287). This seems to provide for a declaratory judgment as to those persons indebted to
the United States. See Frankfurter and Katz, Cases on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure,
93.
' 33 Ariz. 101, 261 Pac. 969, 57 A.L.R. 107 (note) (1928).
2 151 Wash. 273, 275 Pac. 561 (1929).
3 The representations were made by a sub-agent, but since this does not affect the result the
simpler notation is followed.
4 256 N.Y. 392, 176 N.E. 543 (193); reversing 246 N.Y.S. 741, 231 App. Div. 830 (193o).
5 183 N.E. 541 (Ohio App. 1932).
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this case and in the three previous cases. The majority opinion speaks of the
agent as having authority to complete a contract,6 whereas the dissenting judge
specifically states that the agent had authority only to find a purchaser.7
This case illustrates the primary cause of the apparent confusion of the
cases-a failure to isolate the agency problem from other questions involved:
i) Failure to distinguish the question of what constitutes fraud in a particu-
lar jurisdiction from the agency problem is the factor which causes the most diffi-
culty. Whether a certain misrepresentation is fraudulent or not may depend on
whether the court follows Derry v. Peek' or Matteson v. Rice,9 but this does not
determine whether P is to be held for such misrepresentations if made by his
agent. The substantive law of torts does not as an original matter determine the
question of vicarious liability. To illustrate with an example from a field of
physical torts in which the conflict is more sharply defined than in that of fraud:
suppose that A while driving a truck for P negligently stops so close to T that T
suffers from nervous shock. T sues P. If the state in which the action is brought
does not allow recovery for fright, the issue is settled before any problem of
agency arises. That this distinction between the scope of the liability for a tort
and vicarious liability has not been so obvious in the fraud cases is due to the
anomalous character of the common law idea of fraud, partaking as it does of
both contract and tort characteristics. The same anomaly helps to explain the
lag in the growth of the scope of liability for fraud, as compared with that of
physical torts.
2) The second contributing cause of the haze which hides the agency prob-
lem is the question of procedure. Many courts and lawyers do not appreciate the
difference between an affirmative action for fraudulent misrepresentation and a
defensive plea of fraud or a bill in equity to rescind because of fraud.xo Essen-
6 "We are of the opinion that the agents of defendants had implied authority to do more
than just find a buyer and make the representations about the cesspool described in the peti-
tion. Defendants admit that their agents negotiated the transaction between the plaintiff and
the defendants. In other words they do not claim that said agents were employed merely to
find a buyer or to bring the parties together." Lemert, J., supra, note 5, at 542.
7 "To my notion it is a matter of common knowledge that a real estate agent's authority is
limited, in that it ends when he has procured a purchaser willing, able, and ready to enter into a
contract of purchase. It is also the common understanding that the vendor usually reserves to
himself the power to conclude the sale. This was what followed in this case." Sherick, P. J.,
dissenting, supra, note 5, at 543.
8 14 App. Cases 337, 58 L.J.Ch. 864, 61 L.T. 263 (1889).
9 ix6 Wis. 328 (i903). The various views on what constitutes fraud are not strictly within
the scope of this artile. See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42
Harv. L. Rev. 733 (1929); Carpenter, Responsibility for Misrepresentation, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 749
(1930); Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 425 (i916). See
also articles cited therein.
10 Thus in Light v. Chandler Improvement Co., supra note i, in which T (defendant)
claimed recoupment for fraud of A, P (plaintiff) cited Mayo v. Wahlgreen, 9 Colo. App. 5o6,
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tially this is a question of substantive law, though masquerading under the
form of procedure. Some states which do not allow an affirmative action for de-
ceit against an innocent principal will permit the agent's deceit to form the
basis for an equitable action for rescission or a defensive recoupment."1 In
others an innocent misrepresentation by the agent is sufficient ground for a
proceeding for rescission,12 while in a third group even fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions by the agent are not a sufficient basis for rescission as against an innocent
principal.3
Having disposed of these preliminary inquiries, we can focus our attention
upon the comparatively simple agency problem which divides itself into (a) the
question of general and special agents, and (b) the "apparent "authority or
"scope of authority."
The distinction between a general and special agent is still an active principle
in our law14 though it is gradually breaking down.' 5 None of the principal cases
discussed here, for example, consider it as an independent factor. The general
view on the question can be expressed in the words of Haskell v. Starbird,6
"There is no distinction in the matter of responsibility, for the fraud of an agent
authorized to do business generally, and of an agent employed to conduct a
single transaction, if, in either case, he is acting in the business for which he was
employed by the principal, and had full authority to complete the transaction."
In other words the doctrine of ostensible or apparent authority applies alike to
general and special agents, and if the power of the latter to bind the principal
is more limited than that of the former it is only because a third party acting as
a reasonable man would not be justified in ascribing to him such broad powers
as a person entrusted with more duties would be likely to have.
As far as agency law is involved, therefore, our determination of the four
principal cases depends on the answer to a single question. What representa-
tions concerning land could a third person reasonably believe an agent had au-
50 Pac. 40 (x897) and Freyer v. McCord, x65 Pa. 539, 3 Atl. 1024 (1895) which were affirma-
tive actions for deceit. And in Taylor v. Wilson, supra note 4, the dissent cited Light v.
Chandler which represents a defensive use of fraud.
11 Supra, note i; lartin v. Ince, 148 S.W. 1178 (Tex. 1912); McNeile v. Cridland, 168 Pa.
i6, 3i At. 939 (i895); 57 A.L.R. 107, 1i1; Cook, Rescission for Innocent Misrepresentation,
27 Yale L. Jour. 929 (x918); 28 ibid. 178.
12 Ebbs v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 153 S.E. 858 (N.C. 1930).
'3 Luff v. Nevirs, io6 N.J.Eq. 386, 15o AUt. 834 (1930). Cf. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Marotta,
57 F. (2d) io38 (C.C.A. 3rd 1932) which distinguishes the defense of fraud in law from that in
equity.
14 Blackwell v. Ketcham, 53 Ind. 184 (x876); Hatch v. Taylor, io N.H. 538, 54i (184o);
Waldron v. Cutley, io5 N.J.Eq. 586, 144 Atl. 447 (1929); Bowles v. Rice, x07 Va. 5i (,907).
Is Watts v. Howard, 70 Minn. 122 (1897); Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 119 (1890);
i Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914), 39, par. 61 if, 520, par. 737.
' 
6 Supra, note 15.
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thority to make, if such agent's duties consisted of finding a purchaser and
showing him the land, the contract itself being made by the third person and
principal personally? In view of the general custom in America of listing real
estate with numerous brokers at the same time, without giving authority to
complete a contract, 7 the decisions in the principal cases seem sound in holding
that such agent's power is quite limited. His apparent authority does not ex-
tend to making representations concerning the character and quality of the real
estate. His principal is bound only by unauthorized misrepresentations concern-
ing the location and quantity of the land.' This is clearly illustrated in both of
these aspects in Lemarb v. Power, supra, where the court allowed recovery for
the misrepresentation concerning the quantity of the land, but refused to per-
mit damages for the false statements about the Standard Oil lease. Friedman v.
New York Telephone Co., supra, also clearly falls within this principle, the agent
having misrepresented the character of the plumbing. Applying the same prin-
ciple to the agency problem in Light v. Chandler Improvement Co., supra, the prin-
cipal would not be liable in an affirmative action for fraud, since the agent's mis-
representation concerned the quality of the land (fertility). But since the fraud
was pleaded as a defense, we apply our analysis of the procedural problem and
decide as the court did in that case, that fraud can be so pleaded. It is necessary,
however, that the party seeking recoupment bring to the attention of P the fraud
of the agent, and offer to rescind. This was not done in Light v. Chandler Im-
proveinent Co. so the court found for the plaintiff.
It should now be apparent why the importance of a simple question of fact
was stressed as the controlling point in the case of Taylor v. Wilson, supra. If,
as the majority supposed, the agent had authority not only to find a purchaser
but also to close the deal, it would be reasonable to suppose that he had more
authority than a broker whose power was limited to finding a purchaser. Con-
sequently his apparent authority would include the making of representations
concerning the quality and character of the property. 9 Assuming the majority
opinion is correct in its statement of the facts, therefore, all four principal cases
are consistent.
To sum up and collate the rules presented we can state the liability of an inno-
17 See excellent discussion of this point in Light v. Chandler Imp. Co., supra, note i.
is Location of land: Brennen v. Kent, 2o6 Ala. 561, 90 So. 790 (1921) (to set aside convey-
ance); Ballard v. Lyons, ii4 Minn. 264, 131 N.W. 320,38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 3o (i91i) (to recover
money paid on a contract); Green v. Worman, 83 Mo. App. 568 (i9oo) (fraud); Firebaugh v.
Bentley, 65 Ore. 170, 13o Pac. 1129 (1913) (rescission); 57 A.L.R. 107, 117.
Quantity of the land: Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353, 17 Ad. 673, 12 Am. St. Rep. 878
(1889); Farris v. Gilder, 115 S.W. 645 (Tex. i9o8) (to recover value); Mason v. Crosby, i
WVoodb. & M. 342, Fed. Cas. No. 9234 (1846); 57 A.L.R. 107, 117.
19 "The proper application of this rule [that P is liable for the misrepresentations of A within
his apparent authority] may depend on questions of fact and may vary with the circumstances
of each case. Thus it may appear that a real estate broker was also an agent to sell and con-
vey." Pound, J., in Friedman v. N.Y. Telephone Co., supra, note 4.
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cent principal for fraudulent misrepresentations of his agent concerning land as
follows:
i. In an affirmative action of deceit by T against P.
a) If A is merely authorized to find a purchaser, he has power to bind P
only by representations concerning the location and quantity of the land, and
not for those concerning character or quality of the land.
b) If A has authority to complete a contract, he can bind P by representa-
tions concerning quality and character.
2. But although A whose authority is limited to finding a purchaser has no
apparent authority to make representations concerning the character of the
land, T can rescind or recoup in such a case if he notifies P of the fraud and
offers to rescind.
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